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Abstract
Ethics of algorithms is an emerging topic in various disci-
plines such as social science, law, and philosophy, but also
artificial intelligence (AI). The value alignment problem ex-
presses the challenge of (machine) learning values that are, in
some way, aligned with human requirements or values. In this
paper I argue for looking at how humans have formalized and
communicated values, in professional codes of ethics, and
for exploring declarative decision-theoretic ethical programs
(DDTEP) to formalize codes of ethics. This renders machine
ethical reasoning and decision-making, as well as learning,
more transparent and hopefully more accountable. The paper
includes proof-of-concept examples of known toy dilemmas
and gatekeeping domains such as archives and libraries.
Introduction
Imagine you get a message on Facebook saying ”Hi there...
we have computed an above-average depression score for
your friend. Based on other data, we know that positive ac-
tions by close friends can have an impact on his score. If
you want to help your friend, please consider using more
smileys and posting more frequently. Thank you!” This may
sound creepy (Tene and Polonetsky 2014), but it fits in recent
efforts by Facebook to predict potential suicides 1, and by
Google to detect depression 2. Besides invoking people’s so-
cial networks, one could also limit their access to potentially
harmful information, in essence implementing forms of cen-
sorship 3. Such decisions too are becoming more common,
for example by Facebook to fight terrorism 4, by Google to
battle fake news 5 and by Twitter’s new tools 6. With filter
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1https://www.wired.com/2017/03/artificial-intelligence-
learning-predict-prevent-suicide/
2https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/25/google-
clinical-depression-privacy
3http://fortune.com/2017/05/22/facebook-censorship-
transparency/
4http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/16/facebook-using-
artificial-intelligence-combat-terrorist-propaganda/
5http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/16/facebook-using-
artificial-intelligence-combat-terrorist-propaganda/
6https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/02/17/how-
twitters-new-censorship-tools-are-the-pandoras-box-moving-us-
bubbles, fake news and social bots, platforms such as Face-
book and Google may need to do something, but they often
result in situations which humans immediately value differ-
ently, such as in the removal 7 of the iconic ”napalm girl”
photo due to Facebook’s anti-nudity policy.
A novel development in such algorithmic decision making
is the tension between the dependence of humans on such
services for information consumption, and the often intrans-
parent, black box nature of algorithmic decisions. The algo-
rithmization of society brings us many novel ethical issues
in cases ranging from suicide prevention to autonomous cars
(Goodall 2014). The new field ethics of algorithms (Mit-
telstadt et al. 2016; van Otterlo 2017b) goes beyond clas-
sical privacy and surveillance concerns and broadly studies
the impact of algorithms, including fairness, accountability
and transparency. Recent constructive advances in AI focus
on incorporating (ethical) values into systems through value
alignment: how to ”ensure that their behavior is aligned
with the interest of the operators” (Taylor et al. 2017). In
this paper I propose a novel way to address value alignment
inspired by ”pre-algorithmic” code of ethics, in which hu-
mans encode ethical norms and values of a profession. By
formalizing existing human norms into declarative decision-
theoretic ethical programs (DDTEP) one can i) reason and
learn using general, high-level decision models, ii) employ
and extract domain knowledge, and iii) solve the value align-
ment problem by starting with human-agreed ethical val-
ues in a domain, and only learn additional domain-specific
knowledge. This paper explores this novel approach and
highlights new research directions.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the coming
sections I describe human formalizations of ethics and the
ethics of algorithms, and I argue how expressive logical
models of ethics address concerns raised by algorithms and
typical properties of professional codes of ethics. After-
wards I solve elements of previously introduced toy ethical
domains and illustrate how decision-theoretic logic could be
used to implement human ethical values in a transparent way
in the archival domain. This paper ends with a list of open
research directions, technical and domain-specific.
towards-the-end-of-free-speech
7https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/09/facebook-
reinstates-napalm-girl-photo
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Ethics and Human Values
A different take on the previous Facebook suicide detec-
tion case is the work by Juznic et al. (2001) who performed
a ”mystery shopper” experiment in public libraries. They
approached librarians with morally laden topics such as
necrophilia, photos of dead people, and information about
”how to commit suicide”. Interestingly, most librarians were
not shocked at all by the requests and treated them profes-
sionally as pure information enquirements. ”Our conclusion
was that the librarians in public libraries satisfied the need
for information as much as they felt inclined to do so, and
this was not affected by judgments about the ethical status
of the required item of information (Juznic et al. 2001). A
key difference is that Facebook algorithmically predicts ”an
interest” for suicide with the intent of preventing actual sui-
cides, whereas the librarians merely interpret this interest as
a request for information. Another difference is how the eth-
ical values and decision procedures come about: whereas
Facebook decides unilaterally and only partially discloses
its intentions (which are always also connected to its profit
making business model), the librarians have simple, open
ethical guidelines on how to act (and may for some even
cause ethical issues because they take them so strictly).
Taking (practical) action based on moral values is the do-
main of ethics (Laudon 1995; Kizza 2013). Kizza (2013):
”Morality is a set of rules for right conduct, a system used
to modify and regulate our behavior.” Close ties with law
exist since when a society finds certain moral values impor-
tant, it can formalize such values in a law and regulate ap-
propriate behaviors. As Laudon (1995) defines it: ”ethics is
about the decision making and actions of free human beings.
When faced with alternative courses of action or alternative
goals to pursue, ethics helps us to make the correct deci-
sion. If there are options what to do, then ethics is concerned
with practical reasoning about good and bad actions. Impor-
tant subsequent questions are then, for whom is something
good or bad, and by who’s standards? Different answers to
those questions induce a variety of ethical reasoning frame-
works, with two main dimensions. One is about rules vs.
consequences: to find the right decision one may obey rules
like ”thou shalt not kill”, or look at the actual consequences
and decide, e.g. to ignore the maximum speed at night when
there is less traffic. The second dimension deals with ”for
whom” something is good: the individual, or the collective.
In this paper I focus on utilitarian ethics, which is a col-
lective consequentialist framework aimed at maximizing the
average 8 ”goodness” for all those affected.
Humans use several ways to enstate and enforce ethical
norms. As said, the law is one option to ensure compliance,
but in the digital age legal advances can be too slow to keep
up with technology (Tene and Polonetsky 2014), although
recent progress has been made in the general data protection
regulation act (GDPR) 9. A more typical way to deal with
ethical norms is to formalize them as public guidelines or
rules, with well-known examples: Asimov’s three rules for
robotics, the Bible’s ten commandments and the Universal
8Which could be bad for specific individuals though.
9http://www.eugdpr.org/
Declaration on Human Rights (van Otterlo 2014b).
Lately the self-driving car is the archetypical example
for practical machine ethics (Goodall 2014), exemplified in
Thomson’s trolley problem 10 which contains a choice be-
tween either killing five people strapped to a rail, or sav-
ing these five and killing one by pulling a lever diverting
the trolley to a track with a single person (who is then
killed). Trolley problems illustrate the life-or-death deci-
sions autonomous cars may have to make. Recent empir-
ical tests of such dilemmas suggest that humans employ
one-dimensional life scales, where all outcomes (deaths) can
be compared in the same scale, although time pressure af-
fects consistency (Su¨tfeld et al. 2017). A related study re-
veals that people ”approved of utilitarian autonomous vehi-
cles (that is, that sacrifice their passengers for the greater
good) and would like others to buy them, but they would
themselves prefer to ride in ones that protect their passen-
gers at all costs”. Regulations here would possibly hin-
der the widespread acceptance of (utilitarian) self-driving
cars. Thus, this domain involves clear-cut life-and-death de-
cisions amenable to utilitarian modeling, but induces chal-
lenges when distributing the decisions’ negative effects.
A more complex, and underexplored, domain is that of
gatekeeping professions (van Otterlo 2016) such as archives
and libraries (van Otterlo 2017a; 2017b) which have much in
common with modern platforms such as Google and Face-
book in terms of archival, selection and provision of infor-
mation. Decisions in archives deal with who gets access
to which (kind of) information, and induce ethical dilem-
mas involving stakeholders such as users, archivist, and per-
sons occurring in archived materials. Typical dilemmas in-
volve privacy, freedom of information access, and intellec-
tual property. For example, in one of the 86 (empirical)
cases Ferguson, Thornley, and Gibb (2016) list, digitization
of a mass observation project archive from the 1960s/70s
causes a privacy problem for individuals involved. Daniel-
son (1989) introduces the dilemma of equal intellectual ac-
cess, when ease of access to information is different for in-
dividuals. For example, if archival search time is costly, re-
searchers with more resources have an advantage. In addi-
tion, archivists may choose to provide more or less assis-
tance, for example based on a judgement of the researcher’s
quality, thereby making access unequal. The typical way to
resolve ethical issues in gatekeeping domains is a code of
ethics, which specifies rules and values for members of the
profession (Kizza 2013; van Otterlo 2017b). Examples in the
Society of American Archivists 2012 code 11 are: ”Archives
are made accessible to everyone, while respecting the perti-
nent laws and the rights of individuals, creators, owners and
users” and ”Archivists endeavour to inform users of parallel
research by others using the same materials”. Such rules are
less clear-cut, and more open to interpretation but do give di-
rection to how ethical dilemmas should be resolved. Many
professions have several codes of ethics.
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley problem
11https://www2.archivists.org/statements/saa-core-values-
statement-and-code-of-ethics
Figure 1: Reconciling human and machine ethics through decision-theoretic logic.
The Ethics of Algorithms
Turning to algorithms, ethical analysis has only started
fairly recently, see Mittelstadt et al. 2016 and van Otterlo
2017b for pointers. In contrast to popular belief, algorithms
are not objective simply because they are mathematical.
Instead, algorithms are heavily biased by political views,
design processes and many other factors (Bozdag 2013;
van Otterlo 2013). Characterizing the ethics of algorithms is
hard since algorithms and potential consequences are so di-
verse, and situations may change over time. Mittelstadt et al.
(2016) define concerns about how algorithms transform data
into decisions. Evidence can be inconclusive, inscrutable or
misguided and this can cause many ethical consequences of
actions, relating to fairness, opacity, unjustified actions, and
discrimination. Overall, algorithms have impact on privacy
and can have transformative effects on autonomy, i.e. the
ability for humans to make their own choices.
Another way to structure the space of algorithms and and
ethical impact, is by looking at agency, i.e. what they are
capable of, which results in a taxonomy 12 with five broad
classes of algorithms (van Otterlo 2017b). The first type con-
sists of algorithms that reason, infer and search. They em-
ploy data as it is. The more complex they are, the more in-
formation they can extract from that data. Examples include
translation, language understanding, and image recognition.
Ethical concerns about such algorithms are typically about
privacy since more ways become available to interpret and
link more kinds of data. A second class learns and finds gen-
eralized patterns in data. They are typically adaptive ver-
sions of the first type, e.g. a scene recognition algorithm
that is trained on an image stream. They introduce ethical
challenges simply because they learn (outcomes are not sta-
ble), because they can statistically predict new information
(privacy), and they may severely impact users’ autonomy by
profiling and personalization. The third type are algorithms
that optimize to find the ”best” actions. These typically em-
ploy reward functions that represent what are good outcomes
and generally rank things (”the best pizza around”) or people
(e.g. on Tinder). By repeatedly employing actions and opti-
mization steps, algorithms can experiment to find a best pol-
icy in stochastic or unknown environments (Wiering and van
Otterlo 2012). The ethics of experimentation has many as-
pects (van Otterlo 2014a), but important is the choice of re-
ward function (who decides has great power). The fourth and
12Developed in my course ”ethics of algorithms”,
http://martijnvanotterlo.nl/teaching.html
fifth classes concern physical manifestations (e.g. robots)
and superintelligence and are out of scope here.
These five groups illustrate the many sides of the ethics
of algorithms. Each comes with its own set of capabili-
ties but also biases, which determine how it makes choices
and which ethical challenges arise. Opening up algorithmic
black boxes by making these biases, and underlying business
models, transparent, can provide a way to construct AI sys-
tems that have values aligned with human ones, and which
are trustworthy, responsible, and accountable.
Algorithms with Human Ethics
The previous two sections have highlighted aspects of hu-
man and algorithmic ethics. On the left in Figure 1 is a
partial list of requirements from the literature on algorith-
mic systems that mainly have to do with ”turning on the
light” (Tene and Polonetsky 2014), i.e. transparency. These
can help in making AI systems more responsible or account-
able (Diakopoulos 2016). On the right we find the reasons
why humans construct codes of ethics for a particular do-
main (van Otterlo 2017b). Disciplinary and advisory mo-
tives cover the aspects to evaluate humans in the profes-
sion, whereas the other three, publicity in particular, deal
with communication to outside the profession to make clear
which ethical behavior can be expected from members of a
profession. All motives make ethical reasoning in the pro-
fession transparent, by explicitly spelling out norms and de-
sired behaviors. Now, in the ethics of algorithms biases, and
especially a lack of transparency concerning their presence
or influence on decisions, seem to be the prime source of
ethical challenges. However, for human codes of ethics this
is quite the opposite: a code actually is supposed to be a fully
transparent bias on the behavior of professionals. Codes of
ethics can be prescriptive (prescribe do’s and don’ts) or aspi-
rational (only specify ideal results), which makes them more
flexible than, but fairly similar to, legal frameworks.
One intuitive way to obtain algorithmic systems that obey
human values and norms is by learning (Abel, MacGlashan,
and Littman 2016) as a way to obtain value alignment (Tay-
lor et al. 2017). Algorithmic systems can try to learn the
values in a domain from humans, for example using inverse
reinforcement learning. For domains such as autonomous
cars these values may be uncovered (e.g. see Su¨tfeld et al.
(2017) but it is challenging for more complex domains. An
advantage of machine learning is that it can cope with the
uncertainty in ethical domains and that ethical behavior and
values can be induced from suitable behavioral data. How-
ever, a downside of typical methods is that for challenging
domains their knowledge representation capabilities are too
limited to capture a rich variety of structured knowledge do-
mains such as ours. For that we need to turn to more ex-
pressive formalisms such as first-order and relational logic,
which have been used before for machine ethics (Ander-
son and Anderson 2007) but often such systems are lim-
ited to symbolic reasoning and lack mechanisms to explic-
itly compute with uncertainty and utility. To get both, I pro-
pose to look at expressive formalisms for ethical reason-
ing in which knowledge about a problem can be injected,
or extracted after learning, and which can handle decision-
theoretic concepts. Various learning techniques exist for ex-
pressive formalisms, including combinations of Bayesian
networks and relational logic (De Raedt 2008). They can
make learning more comprehensible (Srinivasan 2001) and
increase explanatory power of induced theories, simply be-
cause declarative knowledge employed can be looked at
and analyzed. Some formalisms incorporate reward-based
methods (e.g. reinforcement learning) and support decision-
theoretic decision-making in expressive formalisms (van Ot-
terlo 2012).
Now, a potentially powerful AI combination of men-
tioned aspects can be introduced here (based on the IN-
TERMEDIUM research strategy introduced by van Otterlo
(2017b). In order to obtain value alignment in our gatekeep-
ing domain, instead of trying to learn from scratch, we could
make use of the existing bias which is provided by the codes
of ethics and formalize them in suitable computational log-
ics. This would require a combination of (expressive) declar-
ative knowledge, value optimization, utilitarian-style ethics
and learning, and could induce a baseline system that be-
haves roughly according to human norms. Afterwards, ad-
ditional finetuning of values, domain knowledge and proba-
bilistic aspects can be done from data and interaction. I will
now illustrate this novel idea by solving in decision-theoretic
logic several toy examples in ethical reasoning and a small
gatekeeping problem. My approach fits in recent discussions
on using AI itself to assist in ethical reasoning (Etzioni and
Etzioni 2016) and related rational approaches to machine
ethics (Goodall 2014).
Decision-Theoretic Logical Ethics
Let us look at some examples of declarative, decision-
theoretical ethical programs (DDTEP). I employ DT-
PROBLOG (Van den Broeck et al. 2010), which is a
relational, probabilistic programming language, extended
with decision-theoretic constructs to compute with val-
ues under uncertainty. Given a set of action choices (de-
noted ?::choice-1;...;choice-n), probabilistic dependencies
P (a|b1, . . . bn) (denoted P::a :- b1, b2, ..., bn), back-
ground knowledge definitions if b and c then a (denoted
a :- b, c), and reward specifications R(e) = r (denoted
utility(e,r)), compute the best action, i.e. for which the
total expected reward is maximized. Solutions are computed
by generating all possible worlds modeled by the program,
compiling them into an efficient data structure (e.g. alge-
braic decision diagrams and others), and computing distri-
butions and values on this datastructure in an efficient way.
Let us first look at a self-driving car example as a typi-
cal Thomson case where the car needs to choose beteen driv-
ing into a wall (run into wall: killing the passenger) or driving
over who or what is on the road (carmageddon).
?::run_into_wall;?::carmageddon.
Additional perceptual information is available as:
in_front_of_car(a). baby(a). in_front_of_car(b).
pedestrian(b). in_front_of_car(c). trashcan(c).
in_front_of_car(d). pedestrian(d).
in_front_of_car(e). pedestrian(e).
In case the driver is spared, everyone in front of the car is
killed (X ranges over all possibilities):
kill(X) :- in_front_of_car(X), carmageddon.
Rewards for each possible outcome are specified as follows:
killing the passenger yields −30, and killing a pedestrian,
baby or trashcan contributes −10, −20 and 0, respectively.
utility(run_into_wall, -30).
utility(kill(X), -10) :- pedestrian(X).
utility(kill(X), -20) :- baby(X).
utility(kill(X), 0) :- trashcan(X).
The best decision given this problem is to kill the passenger
(utility is −30) because it has a higher value than killing all
others (3×−10+−20+0 = −50). Note that models like this
use one metric to express all different values, which requires
to directly compare the values of different victims.
A second example is the cake-or-death problem, origi-
nally coined by Armstrong (2015). Here we use the formula-
tion by Abel, MacGlashan, and Littman (2016) who focused
at the inference/optimization step of finding the best policy.
In this problem an agent is unsure whether it is ethical to
bake a cake or to kill people. The agent can either kill three
people or bake a cake, or ask a companion what is ethical. If
the agent chooses to ask, it can then either kill or bake in an
informed way (modeled here explicitly).
?:: ask; ?:: bake_cake; ?::kill.
?:: informed_bake:- ask, cake_is_ethical.
?:: informed_kill:- ask, death_is_ethical.
Killing or baking are equally likely to be ethical:
0.5::cake_is_ethical; 0.5::death_is_ethical.
baked_ethically :- cake_is_ethical, bake_cake.
baked_ethically :- cake_is_ethical, informed_bake.
killed_ethically :- death_is_ethical, kill.
killed_ethically :- death_is_ethical, informed_kill.
If baking is ethical then there is a reward of 1, whereas if
killing is ethical then it delivers a reward of 3:
utility(baked_ethically, 1). utility(killed_ethically, 3).
The value of doing action bake is 0.5× 1 = 0.5 since in half
of the cases it will be ethical and deliver 1, whereas the value
of kill is 0.5×3 = 1.5 and thus better than bake. However, if
the agent first asks, it knows when each action is appropriate,
yielding a utility 0.5 × 1 + 0.5 × 3 = 2.0 and therefore ask
is the optimal action.
In our relational language it is easy to extend the problem
somewhat to capture the presence of any number of people
which can be killed for 1 reward each:
people([ann,bob,carol,dan,evi,finn,gio]).
person(X):-people(Ps),member(X,Ps).
utility(killed_ethically(X), 1):-person(X).
Killing now gets a reward of 7 × 1.0 = 7.0 if it is ethical,
which can happen with 0.5 probability, raising the utility of
the kill action to 3.5 and the ask action to 3.5 + 0.5 = 4.0.
Another extension is to provide probabilistic background
knowledge about how likely it is that particular people like
the cake, and where this probability is tied to whether one
obtains a reward of 1 per person.
0.9::likes_cake(ann). 0.8::likes_cake(bob).
0.7::likes_cake(carol). 0.01::likes_cake(dan).
0.5::likes_cake(evi). 1.0::likes_cake(finn).
1.0::likes_cake(gio).
baked_ethically(X) :- person(X), cake_is_ethical,
(bake_cake;ibc), likes_cake(X).
Baking now has a utility of 2.455 which is still lower than
killing seven people. If we make asking very expensive (say
−20) then the kill action is optimal (instead of ask).
A third example is the burning room dilemma (Abel,
MacGlashan, and Littman 2016). Here a valuable object is
in a room which may be on fire. A robot needs to try to res-
cue the object, and it can take a short route (possible through
the fire, damaging the robot with 0.7 probability) and a long
route. Initially the robot does not know whether the human
operator values the object or the robot more. If the robot is
more valuable (denoted rvip), then it would make sense to
not drive through the fire (and take the long route). How-
ever, taking the long route has a small (0.05) risk of ruining
the object in the fire in the mean time. Just as in the previ-
ous dilemma, the robot needs to choose between two options
(short and long) and an additional ask action (costing −0.5)
which removes ambiguity in what is more valuable.
?::ask;?::long;?::short.
The problem is modeled in a similar fashion as the cake-or-
death dilemma, except that here I omit the extra actions in
case the robot first asks which is more valuable, by modeling
it into the dynamics of ask: if the robot is valuable and if there
is a fire, it will take the long route; otherwise the short. If no
fire, no question is asked and the robot takes the short route.
0.5::fire. 0.05::object_gone:-ask,fire,rvip.
0.5::rvip. 0.05::object_gone:-fire,long.
0.7::robot_gone:-fire,short.
0.7::robot_gone:-ask,fire,\+rvip.
object_saved:-\+object_gone.
saved_long:-object_saved,long,\+robot_gone.
saved_long:-object_saved,\+robot_gone,ask,fire,rvip.
saved_short:-object_saved,short.
saved_short:-object_saved,ask,fire,\+rvip.
saved_short:-object_saved,ask,\+fire.
robot_no_loss:-robot_gone,\+rvip.
robot_loss:-robot_gone,rvip.
askf:-ask,fire.
−10 reward is received if the object gets waisted, and other
negative rewards are obtained when the robot gets damaged
either if it is important (−20) or not (−5). Saving the object
using the short (long) route yields a reward of 10 (6).
utility(object_gone,-10). utility(saved_long,6).
utility(saved_short,10). utility(robot_no_loss,-5).
utility(robot_loss,-20). utility(askf,-0.5).
Taking the long route may sometimes destroy the object in
case of fire and results in a utility of 5.6, whereas taking the
short route may damage the robot and yields a utility 5.625.
However, if the robot first asks whether the robot or the ob-
ject is more valuable, it can optimize its actions and obtain
an optimal 13 score of 7.675. Note that all three problems can
be seen as multi-stage decision networks, where the use of
13These numbers are slighty different from (Abel, MacGlashan,
and Littman 2016) because of a minor difference in interpretation
what happens if the robot is damaged.
background knowledge (e.g. people liking cakes) and rela-
tional constructs (killing individual people) allows for more
general, declarative modeling of ethical dilemmas.
Let us now turn to an example about fair access in
archives. Earlier we have seen examples of archival codes
of ethics, and how dilemmas concerning equal intellectual
access arise. Let us look how such dilemmas could be mod-
eled explicitly and solved. In this setting I assume that there
are multiple researchers wanting to publish several items,
and the ethical dilemma concerns who to let an item publish
for the first time. One solution could be to look at the qual-
ity of academic scholarship. Let us assume that both h-index
and the size of a person’s social network could define a per-
son’s authority and reach respectively. In addition, one could
expect help from researchers connected in Researchgate or
Google Scholar. Here we see that high h-indices and social
network sizes are more likely to generate impact.
0.9::authority(X):-person(X),h_index(X,high).
0.2::authority(X):-person(X),h_index(X,low).
0.9::reach(X):-person(X),social_network(X,large).
0.1::reach(X):-person(X),social_network(X,small).
0.5::help(A,B):-connection(A,B).
Now the potential impact (probability) can be expressed in
terms of authority, reach and possible help:
impact(P,T):-topic(T),authority(P).
impact(P,T):-topic(T),reach(P).
impact(P,T):-topic(T),help(P,T),impact(A,T).
connection(P,A):-(researchgate(P,A);researchgate(A,P)).
connection(P,A):-(google_scholar(P,A);google_scholar(A,P)).
There are four researchers (ann, bob, carol and dan) and for
each some relevant information is available.
person(ann). person(bob). person(carol).
person(dan). topic(area51). topic(stamps).
h_index(ann,high). h_index(bob,low).
h_index(carol,low). h_index(dan,high).
social_network(ann,small).
social_network(bob,small).
social_network(carol,large).
researchgate_connection(ann,bob).
google_scholar_connection(bob,carol).
To construct a decision 14 problem, we need options and re-
wards. The document about area51 is worth 100 with full im-
pact, whereas the boring one about stamps only 1.
?::give(P,T):-person(P),topic(T).
score(P,T):-give(P,T),impact(P,T).
utility(score(P,area51),100):-person(P).
utility(score(P,stamps),1):-person(P).
The optimal policy (value is 92.91) for this problem is to
let carol publish the area51 document, and ann the stamps doc-
ument. This is intuitive given the large reach of carol and
the authority score of ann. However, it may also be seen as
an arbitrary decision, since the rules about authority, reach
and help seem intuitive (and can be considered an explicit
implementation of choices based on academic scholarship
quality) but where do the numbers come from? For this we
can employ parameter learning from data, here specifically
using the learning from interpretations setting (Fierens et al.
2015). Let us take the following data, where each line con-
sists of a single training example in which a researcher made
(or not) an impact with some document.
14I also employ additional constraints to ensure only one per-
son gets a particular document, and all researchers get at most one
document to publish.
evidence(impact(ann,t0),true).
evidence(impact(ann,t1),true).
evidence(impact(ann,t2),true).
evidence(impact(ann,t3),true).
evidence(impact(ann,t5),false).
evidence(impact(dan,t2),true).
evidence(impact(bob,t5),false).
evidence(impact(dan,t3),true).
evidence(impact(carol,t5),false).
evidence(impact(dan,t1),true).
evidence(impact(bob,t2),true).
After training with this data, the probabilities look 15 like:
1.0::authority(X):-person(X),h_index(X,high).
0.99999999::authority(X):-person(X),h_index(X,low).
0.30399904::reach(X):-person(X),social_network(X,large).
0.39326198::reach(X):-person(X),social_network(X,small).
0.50403522::help(A,B):-connection(A,B).
We can see that having an h-index is important for making
impact (i.e. the person should be a researcher) and the influ-
ence of social network sizes is made much smaller, due to
the data. In the new decision problem, the optimal decision
has changed too (value is 101): ann now gets stamps, whereas
dan gets the privilege to publish area51. This makes sense now
since both researchers have high h-indices.
The examples show that DDTEP can open up the black
box of algorithms and make them white box, transparent in
terms of how they make decisions. Still, as the fourth ex-
ample shows, DDTEPs also allow for statistical machine
learning to fill in additional details from data. This general
pattern is something I propose as a way to implement value
alignment in AI systems in complex domains: i) by formal-
izing existing norms and values in a domain into a DDTEP
the inherent ethical bias in a domain becomes transparent,
and ii) by machine learning parts of the program can be fine-
tuned on data. Finetuning is needed because codes of ethics
are never complete, domains are inherently stochastic, and
domain knowledge (or even norms) can change over time.
I propose here to utilize as much ethical common ground
as possible, i.e. the codes of ethics, and model as much of
the crucial decision process explicitly for the sake of trans-
parency, and with that accountability and responsibility.
Discussion and Open directions
In this paper I have presented two main, novel ideas: i) to
employ decision-theoretic logic programming (DDTEPs) to
model and solve ethical problems, and ii) to integrate human
and machine ethics by inserting (formalized) professional
codes of ethics as bias into DDTEPs. The latter could be
characterized 16 by saying that the code of ethics functions
as a moral contract between human and machine, thereby
unifying the two approaches in the first half of the paper.
DDTEPs are partial programs which can be finetuned using
data. Value alignment can be obtained by formalizing ex-
isting human values and norms into flexible but expressive
formalisms such as DDTEPs. The examples shown in the
15Values are the outcomes of an EM algorithm with very few
data, hence the exact numbers are only for illustration purposes.
16This is related to proposals such as machine learning with con-
tracts and partially specified models, see (Amodei et al. 2016).
previous sections show that DDTEPs are intuitive and ef-
fective for modeling typical problems from the literature, but
also that interesting challenges in new domains such as gate-
keeping can be approached. The examples show viability of
the approach, but a lot is still to be done do develop fully au-
tonomous ethical reasoning systems that behave according
to human norms and values. There are many domain-specific
and AI-technical open research directions.
Domain-specific open problems are plenty. First, which
code of ethics will be taken as bias (since there are already
several for gatekeeping domains (van Otterlo 2017b))? How
to formalize fuzzy natural language codes exactly into log-
ical models is another problem, for which we can take in-
spiration from the neighboring field of AI and law (Prakken
2017). This could also provide a basis to incorporate legal
frameworks such as the GDPR into DDTEPs. A more gen-
eral open direction for any profession is to research what
are good outcomes. A professional code formalizes what it
means to be a good member of the profession, but it would
be more effective to directly think about the characterization
of ”good outcomes” of professional’s policies. And in that
same context, it needs to be investigated whether all these
outcomes can be measured using the same metric or that
more (types of) metrics are needed. Overall, the approach
requires professionals to think more rigorously about which
ethical norms and values can be specified beforehand, and
which need to be learned online.
AI-technical open problems come from the fact that
DDTEPs are formal decision problems, and methods de-
veloped there can be utilized for ethics. First, I have here
used DT-PROBLOG but there are other systems which could
be used, for example based on Markov logic or relational
decision networks. Furthermore, structure (instead of pa-
rameter) learning methods could be employed to learn new
background knowledge fragments, depending on the system
chosen. Longer multi-step ethical decision making could
also be investigated from the viewpoint of (partially observ-
able) Markov decision processes, for which many additional
value-based techniques are available (van Otterlo 2012;
Wiering and van Otterlo 2012). I have focused on obtaining
most ethical values from human codes, but also (some of) the
values could be learned, e.g. by inverse reinforcement learn-
ing. Literature on value alignment is growing (Soares 2015;
Abel, MacGlashan, and Littman 2016; Amodei et al. 2016;
Taylor et al. 2017) and many challenges need to be solved. In
that context, many new teaching, instruction and demonstra-
tion techniques can be used to let humans teach systems how
to behave. As an example, the particular language used for
DDTEP was used successfully in a learning from demon-
stration robotics setting (Moldovan et al. 2012). A very in-
teresting direction concerns the formal verification of ethical
programs: by expressing all in a (decision-theoretic) logic, it
becomes possible to prove properties of DDTEPs (e.g. ”the
car program is guaranteed to reach at least a value 10 for
any traffic decision”) or to analyze executable ethical speci-
fications by looking at their potential errors or ethical-logical
inconsistencies. Overall, the combination of formal verifica-
tion methods and AI-style decision making (see Littman et
al. (2017) for an interesting example of reinforcement learn-
ing combined with goal specifications) is another promising
way to reconcile human and machine ethics.
References
Abel, D.; MacGlashan, J.; and Littman, M. 2016. Reinforce-
ment learning as a framework for ethical decision making. In
AAAI Workshop: AI, Ethics, and Society.
Amodei, D.; Olah, C.; Steinhardt, J.; Christiano, P.; Schul-
man, J.; and Mane´, D. 2016. Concrete problems in AI safety.
CoRR abs/1606.06565.
Anderson, M., and Anderson, S. 2007. Machine ethics:
Creating an ethical intelligent agent. AI Magazine 28:15–
26.
Armstrong, S. 2015. Motivated value selection for artifi-
cial agents. In AAAI Workshop: Artificial Intelligence and
Ethics.
Bozdag, E. 2013. Bias in algorithmic filtering and person-
alization. Ethics of Information Technology 15(209).
Danielson, E. 1989. The ethics of access. American
Archivist 52:52–62.
De Raedt, L. 2008. Logical and Relational Learning.
Springer.
Diakopoulos, N. 2016. Accountability in algorithmic deci-
sion making. Communications of the ACM 59(2):56–62.
Etzioni, A., and Etzioni, O. 2016. Designing AI systems
that obey our laws and values. Communications of the ACM
59(9):29–31.
Ferguson, S.; Thornley, C.; and Gibb, F. 2016. Beyond
codes of ethics: How library and information professionals
navigate ethical dilemmas in a complex and dynamic infor-
mation environment. International Journal of Information
Management 36(4):543–556.
Fierens, D.; Van den Broeck, G.; Renkens, J.; Shterionov,
D.; Gutmann, B.; Thon, I.; Janssens, G.; and De Raedt, L.
2015. Inference and learning in probabilistic logic programs
using weighted boolean formulas. Theory and Practice of
Logic Programming 15(3):358–401.
Goodall, N. 2014. Ethical decision making during auto-
mated vehicle crashes. Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board 2424:58–65.
Juznic, P.; Urbanija, J.; Grabrijan, E.; Miklavc, S.; Oslaj, D.;
and S., S. S. 2001. Excuse me, how do I commit suicide?
access to ethically disputed items of information in public
libraries. Library Management 22(1/2):75–79.
Kizza, J. 2013. Ethical and Social Issues in the Information
Age. Springer.
Laudon, K. 1995. Ethical concepts and information tech-
nology. Communications of the ACM 38(12):33–39.
Littman, M.; Topcu, U.; Fu, J.; Isbell Jr., C.; Min, W.; and
MacGlashan, J. 2017. Environment-independent task spec-
ifications via GLTL. http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.04341.
Mittelstadt, B.; Allo, P.; Taddeo, M.; Wachter, S.; and
Floridi, L. 2016. The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the
debate. Big Data & Society 3(2).
Moldovan, B.; Moreno, P.; van Otterlo, M.; Santos-Victor,
J.; and De Raedt, L. 2012. Learning relational affordance
models for robots in multi-object manipulation tasks. In Pro-
ceedings of ICRA.
Prakken, H. 2017. On the problem of making autonomous
vehicles conform to traffic law. Artificial Intelligence and
Law 25:341–363.
Soares, N. 2015. The value learning problem. Machine
Intelligence Research Institute, Technical report 2015-4.
Srinivasan, A. 2001. Four suggestions and a rule concerning
the application of ILP. In Dzeroski, S., and Lavrac, N., eds.,
Relational Data Mining. Springer. chapter 15, 365–374.
Su¨tfeld, L.; Richard, G.; Ko¨nig, P.; and Gordon, P. 2017.
Using virtual reality to assess ethical decisions in road traffic
scenarios. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 11(122).
Taylor, J.; Yudkowsky, E.; LaVictoire, P.; and
Critch, A. 2017. Alignment for advanced ma-
chine learning systems. MIRI (unpublished)
https://intelligence.org/2016/07/27/alignment-machine-
learning/.
Tene, O., and Polonetsky, J. 2014. A theory of creepy: Tech-
nology, privacy, and shifting social norms. Yale Journal of
Law and Technology 16(1).
Van den Broeck, G.; Thon, I.; Van Otterlo, M.; and De
Raedt, L. 2010. DTProbLog: A decision-theoretic proba-
bilistic prolog. In Proceedings of AAAI.
van Otterlo, M. 2012. Solving relational and first-order
Markov decision processes: A survey. In Wiering, M., and
van Otterlo, M., eds., Reinforcement Learning: State-of-the-
art. Springer. chapter 8, 253–292.
van Otterlo, M. 2013. A machine learning perspective on
profiling. In Hildebrandt, M., and de Vries, K., eds., Pri-
vacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn. Routledge.
chapter 2, 41–64.
van Otterlo, M. 2014a. Automated experimentation in
Walden 3.0. : The next step in profiling, predicting, control
and surveillance. Surveillance and Society 12(2).
van Otterlo, M. 2014b. Broadening the privacy concept
in the digital age: Adjusting rights? Amnesty Strategic
Investigations papers on Surveillance and Human Rights,
https://martijnvanotterlo.nl/vanOtterlo2014Amnesty-
PositionPaper.pdf.
van Otterlo, M. 2016. The libraryness of calculative devices.
In Amoore, L., and Piotukh, V., eds., Algorithmic Life: Cal-
culative Devices in the Age of Big Data. Routledge. chap-
ter 2, 35–54.
van Otterlo, M. 2017a. From intended archivists to inten-
tional algivists: Ethical codes for humans and machines in
the archives. In Smit, F.; Glaudemans, A.; and Jonker, R.,
eds., Archives in Liquid Times. Stichting Archiefpublicaties
(S@P). chapter 12, 267–293.
van Otterlo, M. 2017b. Gatekeeping algorithms with human
ethical bias: The ethics of algorithms in archives, libraries
and society. (in review).
Wiering, M., and van Otterlo, M., eds. 2012. Reinforcement
Learning: State-of-the-art. Springer.
